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Abstract 
A scientific theory can be roughly characterized as a collective endeavor aiming at finding true 
explanatory principles in a given area. An important feature of this collective endeavor is that it is made  
of individuals belonging to various and not necessarily overlapping generations. How can and should 
these generations collaborate to maximize their chances to discover and accept correct explanatory 
principles ? 
The theory of judgment aggregation seems like a perfect framework in which to investigate this 
question : broadly understood, this theory seeks to find out how a group of individuals could produce 
judgments or decisions that outperform the capabilities of their  individual  members.  This effort  to 
design  aggregative  procedures  must  meet  two  challenges  :  the  coherence  challenge  and  the 
correspondence challenge. The first one originates in the problem of inconsistent majority judgment, 
“the discursive paradox” (List, 2011). The second challenge stems from Condorcet's jury theorem (List, 
2010). In my paper, I want to address the ability of scientific research to meet this second challenge : is 
there a procedure of intergenerational judgment aggregation that will result in more reliable theories 
than those that would have been produced by each researcher working individually ?  
At first glance, scientific communities fit perfectly into this mold. Sociological and cognitive 
descriptions of these communities (Knorr-Cettina, 1999) (Giere, 2002) have recently been construed 
within this framework (List, 2010), and in particular through List's theorem : in groups confronted with 
several propositions and where individuals have different areas and levels of expertise, there is a level 
of individual expertise in a given area that leads to a higher  probability of truth  when these individuals 
are distributed among specialized committees, here understood as the communities described by Knorr-
Cetina (1999). 
However, science is not only a sociological phenomenon, but also an historical phenomenon, 
i.e.  an intergenerational  process  of cooperation.  Therefore,  to  be applied  to  scientific  research,  the 
theory of judgement aggregation must meet the following condition : the aggregation of the judgements 
of individuals belonging to different periods  must produce judgements whose probability is higher 
than that one of each one of these judgements taken separately. 
We can distinguish three consequences of this intergenerational feature of scientific practice : 
(1) the creation of new questions (Jardine, 1991); (2) the extension of empirical knowledge through 
technological innovations (Shapere, 1998); (3) the apparition of new hypotheses. From our standpoint, 
the first feature is not relevant since we are seeking how to aggregate judgments concerning a defined 
question. The second feature might be more interesting for us ; but one could easily extend the existing 
theory of judgement aggregation in order to integrate this aspect of science. To that end, it is only 
necessary to  consider  each generation  as  being endowed by their  technological  knowledge with  a 
different  level of expertise.  We can use the distributed premised-based procedure and attribute  the 
highest level of expertise to the present generations and the lowest to the past generations. It could 
follow from this model that past generations do not have to be taken into account in the aggregation 
procedure.  
I  claim that the third feature could be an impediment to the generalization of the theory of 
judgment aggregation to scientific practice. Kyle Standford (2004) has recently has highlighted this 
aspect of history of science and labeled it “ the problem of unconceived  alternatives”. To put it in a 
nutshell, Stanford shows that a defined generation of researchers is not able to imagine all possible 
relevant hypotheses, i.e. all possible answers to a given question. This inability can be traced back to 
our limited cognitive capabilities but also to the social inheritance of preformed concepts (Thagard, 
1992) : without conceptual revolutions, new hypotheses can not be conceived. 
This characterization of social practices seems to disqualify the aggregation judgment approach 
for  three  reasons.  First,  it  entails  an  important  difference  between  the  background  assumptions 
describing a collective judgment situation and any scientific judgment situation : whereas the former 
supposes that the hypotheses are already given to the individuals by an “ideal interviewer,” scientific 
agents have to produce independently these possible answers. Second, the existence of unconceived 
alternatives  lowers the individual probability of making true judgments : since the number of possible 
cases is substantially increased, the rate of systematic error increases so much as to be lower than 0.5. 
At that point,  the Condorcet majority theorem states that the aggregate judgment will  be incorrect. 
Third, there is an asymmetry between probabilistic limitations in judgment formation and social and 
cognitive limits to our imagination : whereas one individual can always express a judgment, once he 
has been provided with a question and a set of possible answers, his imagination either works or not. 
Therefore,  the  aggregation  of  all  the  hypotheses  conceived  within  a  group  of  individuals  is  not 
necessary since  its  outcome would  be  strictly  equal  to  the  set  of  hypotheses  conceived  by a  few 
imaginative people. 
In  my  paper,  I  intend  to  extend  the  aggregation  judgment  theory  to  scientific  research  by 
offering an aggregation procedure that meets the challenges that follow from Stanford description of 
intergenerational relationships within scientific communities. 
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